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In 2010, as a whole, the world economy continued the process of recovery and financial 
normalisation with which it had ended 2009 and grew by 5%, following the contraction of 
0.5% posted in the previous year. The emerging economies, whose fundamentals had 
scarcely been affected by the crisis, recovered more strongly and grew by 7.3%, which 
accounted for more than three quarters of world growth. The more gradual upturn of 3% 
experienced by the developed economies varied notably across countries, the United 
States and Japan being the most buoyant economies in this group. However, in most 
cases – the United Kingdom, the euro area and Japan – activity has still not returned to its 
pre-crisis levels as seen in Chart 3.1.
In the developed economies the recovery was subject to fluctuations and uncertainties 
throughout the year. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and doubts about the 
soundness of the upturn in the United States seriously affected confidence and markets 
around the second quarter. It was only with the support from fresh monetary and fiscal 
stimuli in the United States that confidence in the recovery was restored in the last four 
months of the year. Notwithstanding this, the risks to the recovery remained high and in-
cluded, most notably, the upward trend in commodity prices, triggered by the strong 
growth of the emerging economies, and the ongoing sovereign debt problems in Europe. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of 2011 major shocks occurred – there was a wave of insta-
bility in the Arab world and an earthquake with grave consequences in Japan – which have 
exacerbated certain of these risk elements.
During 2010, ongoing wide output gaps, weak labour markets and the process of reor-
ganisation of public and private balance sheets constrained the expansion of domestic 
demand in the developed economies and eased inflationary pressures. However, increas-
es in commodity prices, which intensified in 2011, have lifted inflation from average rates 
of approximately 1% in mid-2010 to the present level of more than 2%. In the emerging 
economies, inflationary pressures have been stronger and in certain cases – mainly in Asia 
– inflation rates have exceeded their pre-crisis levels.
The recovery was accompanied by the normalisation of international trade, which in 2010 
increased by 12% in volume and exceeded its pre-crisis levels. Noteworthy were the 
buoyancy of the trade of (and between) emerging countries and the fact that global imbal-
ances once again widened, albeit moderately. The return of financial flows towards emerg-
ing economies has been very strong, accentuating the risks of some of them overheating. 
The reorganisation of international financial flows reflects the adjustment of the global fi-
nancial system to a situation in which the outlook for emerging economies is better than 
that for advanced economies, while the latter continue to correct the excesses which led 
to the crisis.
Economic policies continued to play an essential role as a support for activity. In fact, un-
certainty about the recovery and the financial situation led to the postponement of the exit 
strategies from expansionary monetary policies, which were anticipated at the beginning 
of the year, and there was even some further loosening in the United States and Japan. In 
the fiscal arena, there was a pronounced difference in behaviour between the fiscal con-
solidation in Europe - prompted by sovereign debt problems in the euro area - and fresh 
fiscal stimuli in Japan and the United States.
1  Introduction
In 2010, the world economy 
made progress in emerging 
from the crisis and grew by 
5%, underpinned by the 
buoyant emerging economies, 
whereas the recovery in the 
advanced economies was 
more gradual
Inflation rates have risen from 
very low levels, driven higher 
by the upswing in commodity 
prices
International trade returned to 
a normal footing and 
international capital flows 
picked up
Economic policies continued 
to play an essential role as a 
support for activity
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
UNITED STATES
    GDP (a) 0.0 -2.6 2.9 2.4 3.0 3.2 2.8
    CPI (a) (f) 3.8 -0.4 1.6 2.4 1.8 1.2 1.3
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -4.7 -2.7 -3.2 -3.0 -3.4 -3.4 -3.1
    General government balance (% of GDP) -6.3 -11.3 -10.6 -10.7 -11.1 -10.4 -10.3
JAPAN
    GDP (a) -1.2 -6.3 3.9 5.6 3.1 4.9 2.2
    CPI (a) (f) 1.4 -1.4 -0.7 -1.2 -0.9 -0.8 0.1
    Current account balance (% of GDP) 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
    General government balance (% of GDP) -4.1 -10.2 -9.6 -7.4 -7.1 -7.3 -7.5
EURO AREA
    GDP (a) 0.3 -4.1 1.8 0.8 2.0 1.9 2.0
    CPI (a) (f) 3.3 0.3 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.0
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.7 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6
    General government balance (% of GDP) -1.9 -6.3 -6.5 — — — —
UNITED KINGDOM
    GDP (a) -0.1 -4.9 1.3 -0.3 1.6 2.5 1.5
    CPI (a) (f) 3.6 2.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.4
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -1.6 -1.7 -2.5 -2.6 -2.1 -2.4 -2.9
    General government balance (% of GDP) -3.6 -8.6 -8.9 -7.3 -9.5 -7.9 -10.7
CHINA
    GDP (a) 9.6 9.2 10.3 11.9 10.3 9.6 9.8
    CPI (a) (f) 5.9 -0.7 3.3 2.2 2.9 3.5 4.7
    Current account balance (% of GDP) 9.3 4.9 5.2 4.5 5.4 7.2 5.3
    General government balance (% of GDP) -0.8 -2.8 -1.6 6.5 4.6 -1.0 -11.8
LATIN AMERICA (b) (c)
    GDP (a) 4.3 -2.0 6.3 5.9 7.9 6.0 5.3
    CPI (a) (f) 7.8 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.7
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7
    General government balance (% of GDP) -0.5 -2.9 -2.2 -2.7 -2.5 -2.1 -2.0
NON-EURO AREA EU MEMBER STATES THAT JOINED EU IN 2004 OR 2007 (b) (d)
    GDP 4.4 -3.4 1.9 0.6 2.0 2.1 2.8
    CPI (a) (f) 6.4 3.6 3.1 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.7
    Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.4 -2.7 -2.6 -1.0 -2.0 -4.4 —
    General government balance (% of GDP) -3.6 -6.9 -6.4 — — — —
PRO-MEMORIA: GDP GROWTH (e)
    World 2.5 -1.0 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.6
    Developed countries 0.1 -3.5 2.6 2.1 2.7 3.0 2.4
    Emerging countries 5.7 2.1 7.9 8.7 8.6 7.3 7.1
PRO-MEMORIA: INFLATION (e)
    World 4.5 2.9 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.0 3.6
    Developed countries 1.6 0.1 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.3 1.7
    Emerging countries 8.1 5.2 6.2 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.7
2010
2008 2009 2010
MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 3.1 
SOURCES: Banco de España, IMF and national statistics.
a Annual percentage change. 
b The aggregate for the different areas has been calculated using the weight of the countries making up such areas in the world economy in the previous year, in 
PPP. Based on IMF information.
c Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru.
d Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.
e Quarterly data based on a sample of countries representing 90% of world GDP.
f Quarterly CPI corresponds to the average for the quarter. 
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The outlook for the global economy is one of a gradual recovery, although it will be ham-
pered by the adjustments which are still pending in the developed economies and subject 
to notable uncertainty. The deterioration of public finances and the upward trend in com-
modity prices will reduce the authorities’ margin for manoeuvre and may undermine con-
fidence again. In parallel, the global economy remains immersed in a process of profound 
structural change characterised by the increasingly important role of emerging economies 
as engines of economic growth (see Box 3.1) and a new framework of international coop-
eration in the formulation of economic policies.
At the beginning of 2010 global economic activity continued to recover against a backdrop 
of moderate inflation, carrying on the trend that began in the second half of 2009. World 
GDP increased at a year-on-year growth rate of 5.1% in Q1, boosted mainly by the emerg-
ing economies, which grew by 8.7% year-on-year (see Chart 3.2). For their part, the ad-
vanced economies expanded by 2.1% year-on-year (3.1% in annualised quarter-on-quarter 
terms), supported by stockbuilding and private consumption; the external sector’s contri-
bution to growth was negative despite the recovery of exports. The upturn was more robust 
in the United States and Japan, which posted annualised quarter-on-quarter growth of 
3.7% and 6%, respectively, and more moderate in the United Kingdom. In any event, 
Emerging from the crisis will 
be a slow process and 
inflationary risks will become 
more important
2  Economic and financial 
developments
In 2010 Q1, global economic 
activity continued to pick up, 
more sharply in the emerging 
economies...
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The emerging economies have become increasingly important actors 
in the global economy, raising their share of world GDP, trade and fi-
nancial flows. This process strengthened from the turn of the century 
and intensified further during the financial crisis. Also as a result of the 
crisis, there have been significant changes in the governance of inter-
national economic institutions, which have crystallised into greater 
participation by the emerging countries, more in line with their relative 
weight in the world economy. Within the group of emerging econo-
mies, these trends have been particularly strong in the most sys-
temically important countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China, col-
lectively known as the BRICs).
Traditionally, the medium- and low- income economies (included here 
in the category emerging economies), which account for most of the 
world’s population, have recorded similar growth rates to the ad-
vanced countries, which has limited real convergence between these 
two groups of countries. However, in the last decade the advanced 
economies have grown by about 2% and the emerging economies 
by somewhat more than 6%, a disparity that, according to IMF long-
term forecasts, will be sustained over the period 2011-15. This pro-
gress has enabled these countries to improve their living standards 
significantly, and has been reflected in an increase in the human de-
velopment index and in a sharp rise in per-capita GDP (of 28.3% 
between 2000 and 2009). Within the emerging economies, the four 
BRIC countries are among those that have grown most (by 8% on 
average between 2000 and 2010, a rate that is expected to be sus-
tained between 2011 and 2015), and those that have converged 
most rapidly with the developed countries (see Chart 1). This strong 
growth over the last ten years has led to a significant increase in the 
share of the emerging economies in world output, from one third in 
1980 to almost one half now, a level that will be clearly exceeded in 
2015 (53% of world GDP). The BRICs’ share of world GDP rose from 
12% in 1980 to 25% in 2010, and could reach 29% in 2015, with 
China accounting for the largest part of the increase. Given their 
strong relative growth rate and the increase in their share of the world 
economy, the contribution of emerging economies to world growth 
BOX 3.1THE GROWING WEIGHT OF EMERGING ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY1
1  See, for more details, “El creciente peso de las economías emergentes 
en la economía y gobernanza mundiales: los países BRIC”, Documentos 
Ocasionales, No. 1101, Banco de España.
SOURCES: IMF, World Bank and UN.
a Current IMF dejnition
b Brazil, Russia, India and China.
c IMF estimates in WEO, October 2010.
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BOX 3.1THE GROWING WEIGHT OF EMERGING ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (cont’d)
has also increased substantially; in the last decade these countries 
have accounted for more than half of world growth (see Chart 2).
This progress has been made against a background of greater inte-
gration in the world economy of the emerging economies, which 
have also become the main beneficiaries and engines of globalisa-
tion. This process has been accompanied by a gradual improvement 
– albeit uneven across countries – in the institutional and macroeco-
nomic framework of these economies, which has helped them to 
avoid the most negative effects of the crisis and to draw a dividing 
line from their own past.
The integration has taken place in both the trade and financial 
spheres, although it has been more pronounced in the former. The 
emerging economies increased their degree of openness to trade 
significantly from 2000 and are playing an increasingly important role 
in world trade (see Chart 3). The higher degree of openness of the 
developing economies largely reflects greater trade between the 
emerging regions themselves. Such trade increased from 25.1% of 
the total external trade of these economies in 1990 to 37.6% in 2009. 
The foreign trade of these countries is basically centred on raw mate-
rials, the BRIC countries being particularly important here, either as 
net exporters (Brazil and Russia) or as net importers (China and In-
dia). Notwithstanding the bias towards trade in raw materials, China 
(in manufacturing), India (in services) and other emerging economies 
(in particular in Asia) are rapidly increasing the technological content 
of their exports.
As in the case of trade, the financial integration of the emerging econ-
omies has intensified in recent decades. Direct investment has played 
a notable role in this process. While in 1990 direct investment flows 
were practically confined to the advanced economies (99% of out-
flows and 87% of inflows), in 2009 the developing economies re-
ceived 38.2% of all direct investment inflows (see Chart 4) and were 
responsible for 15% of all outflows. Around half of the inflows and 
outflows of direct investment in the emerging economies correspond 
to the BRICs, with China standing out as the second largest recipient 
of direct investment inflows. The increase in the share of other capital 
flows has been less pronounced, partly due to the restrictions on the 
openness of the capital account that persist in some important coun-
tries, although Brazil and other Latin American and Asian countries 
play an important role in international flows of portfolio and fixed in-
come investment. Moreover, the favourable outlook for growth in the 
short and medium-term and lower macroeconomic volatility have 
reduced the perception of risk traditionally associated with the 
emerging economies and may contribute to a reorientation of inter-
national capital flows towards these economies in the coming years. 
This process is not risk-free, given the volatility and institutional fragil-
ity that still characterise many of these economies.
The growing weight of the emerging economies on the international 
stage means that the main actors are no longer limited to the G7 
countries. Indeed, the financial crisis has led to an increase in the 
weight of these economies in global financial institutions. Factors 
contributing to this change have been the relatively favourable behav-
iour of the emerging economies during the crisis and the need to in-
volve them in the economic policy responses required to overcome it. 
The changes in world economic governance over the last three years 
have taken place in numerous spheres: the G20’s acquisition of pre-
eminence over the G7, the creation of the Financial Stability Board, 
with the participation of the emerging G20 countries, and the in-
crease in their weights and voting power in the World Bank and IMF 
in 2010. Furthermore, the summits of heads of state of the so-called 
BRICs have begun to become institutionalised, reflecting the greater 
institutional links between emerging economies, with the aim of pre-
senting a common front at the global level.
The result of these macroeconomic, trade and financial develop-
ments will be a world economy that is increasingly more globalised, 
multipolar and independent than it was at the end of the 20th cen-
tury. Global governance structures, in which the emerging econo-
mies have acquired greater prominence, are adapting to this new 
situation, and mechanisms are taking shape to coordinate all the 
important actors, so as to ensure that growth in the world economy 
is more balanced and sustainable. However, this reshaping of global 
governance structures is neither free of difficulties nor of challenges, 
starting with the active and constructive involvement of the systemic 
emerging countries in the most important areas of international eco-
nomic relations, such as global imbalances, financial reform, trade 
agreements and efforts to combat climate change.
growth in the developed economies continued to be underpinned by stimulus policies and 
its foundations remained fragile: employment was weak and unemployment rates were high 
(see Chart 3.3); indebtedness was still excessive in the non-financial private sector; restruc-
turing was still needed in financial systems and activity in real estate markets was minimal.
In the emerging economies the recovery was gaining momentum in early 2010, particularly 
in China, which posted growth of approximately 10% year-on-year in Q1, and in the rest of 
emerging Asia and Latin America, which expanded by rates of around 8.5% and 6%, re-
spectively. This buoyancy was driven by strong domestic demand and, in particular, by in-
vestment, a growth pattern that indicated a certain independence from developed econo-
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mies, in the absence of fresh shocks (see Chart 3.2). In Eastern Europe, by contrast, where 
the crisis had hit harder, the expansion was more moderate. The increase in trade between 
emerging economies, especially the Asian economies, was also faster (see Chart 3.3).
The performance of financial markets continued to improve at the beginning of 2010, in 
line with the trend that began half way through the previous year (see Chart 3.4). The early 
months of the year were marked by the recovery of the appetite for risk and lower volatil-
ity, which returned to its levels prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. This favourable 
environment gave rise to stock market gains, a rise in long-term interest rates and a nar-
rowing of the spreads on corporate and emerging sovereign bonds. The increase in profits 
and the notable level of issuance on capital markets improved the corporate sector’s fi-
nancial capacity despite weak bank lending (see Chart 3.5).
However, there were underlying weaknesses behind this favourable performance. The ad-
vanced economies’ financial systems – still immersed in restructuring processes – had not 
… and was accompanied by 
an improvement in the 
financial environment, which 
was not without weaknesses
SOURCES: IMF, Datastream, JP Morgan, Eurostat, national statistics and Banco de España.  
a G4: United States, Japan, United Kingdom and euro area. Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Mexico. Emerging Asia: India, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore. New EU members: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Rumania.  
b In China, the government consumption component represents total consumption (government and private).
c Contribution, in percentage points, to the annualised quarterly change in GDP. 
d In-house calculations based on data for 57 countries that represent 90% of world GDP. The aggregates have been calculated using the weight of the countries 
in the world economy in the previous year, in PPP, according to IMF information.  
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resumed their role as intermediaries in the financing of firms and households, and credit 
continued to adjust. As for the bank deleveraging and recapitalisation processes, vulner-
abilities remained on the liabilities side, with substantial volumes of short-term financing, 
and there were still troubled segments in the financial system in some countries. Further-
more, since end-2009 problems had been incubating on the sovereign debt markets, 
which would ultimately affect confidence in banking systems.
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Growing instability on certain European sovereign debt markets peaked in May when the 
turmoil associated with fiscal difficulties in Greece, after spreading to the euro area, af-
fected global markets, including emerging ones, which had been the most resilient until that 
time. World stock markets recorded considerable losses and there was a sharp increase in 
volatility, although not as extreme as that in September 2008. Furthermore, the process of 
issuance returning to normal on fixed-income markets came to a halt. Investors’ search for 
In May, the European sovereign 
debt crisis unleashed a bout of 
instability on global markets 
and activity in the advanced 
economies began to show 
signs of weakness
SOURCES: Datastream and Bloomberg.
a VIX index (volatility of the Standard & Poors 500 index) and 5-year US CDX investment grade credit risk index.
b EMBI+ for Latin America and EMBI Global for Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.
c Industrial corporate bonds. Differentials vis-à-vis swaps.
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safe havens resulted in a fresh decrease in US bond yields – and in those of other advanced 
economies – with the result that the ten-year yield dropped to levels of around 2.5% in 
summer, approaching the lows recorded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The dol-
lar and yen also appreciated strongly; at the beginning of June the dollar traded against the 
euro at its highest levels since 2006 ($1.21/€), as shown in Chart 3.4. In this scenario, 
banks’ financing conditions tightened at the same time as their credit risk deteriorated.
The unfavourable impact on financial markets was accentuated by the signs of a slow-
down in the US economy, which emerged during the second quarter of the year. This 
change was determined largely by the downturn in the housing market, which occurred 
when part of the tax relief it enjoyed ended. Furthermore, on the labour market, employ-
ment showed signs of renewed weakness, while the unemployment rate reached levels of 
approximately 9.5% and the labour force fell owing to a discouragement effect.
The response of the European authorities to the Greek crisis, the results of the stress tests 
of European banks released in July and the publication of business and bank profits, 
mainly in the United States, contributed to the stabilisation of financial markets over the 
summer, although doubts remained about the recovery. US GDP growth in Q2 (1.7% in 
annualised quarter-on-quarter terms), which was published in July, confirmed the loss of 
economic momentum and the weakness of private consumption. The lack of vigour spread 
Throughout the summer 
markets stabilised, while 
uncertainty about the economy 
prompted a fresh round of 
monetary and fiscal stimulus in 
the United States…
SOURCES: Datastream, Bureau of Economics, Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England, Banco de España, Bank of Japan and Dealogic.  
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to other economies such as Japan’s, while the United Kingdom recorded a recovery (that 
turned out to be temporary) following several quarters of sluggishness, which was led by 
buoyant private consumption.
The signs of economic weakness prompted an expansionary turn in the economic policy 
stance in the United States. Following the gradual (and passive) withdrawal of support for 
liquidity and financing during the first half of the year, the Federal Reserve pre-announced 
at the end of August a fresh phase of non-conventional monetary expansion, which began 
to be implemented in November. In addition to the monetary impulse, in December a new 
substantial fiscal stimulus package was introduced. Japan also implemented a new fiscal 
programme in that period, albeit on a more modest scale. These two cases contrast with 
the fiscal adjustment introduced in Europe, including the United Kingdom, as a result of 
the sovereign debt crisis in certain countries in the euro area (see Section 3.1).
The stimulus measures in the United States prompted a notable improvement in the eco-
nomic outlook at the same time as they contributed to anchoring the confidence of the fi-
nancial markets, despite representing a serious setback for fiscal consolidation. The easing 
of financial tensions was reflected in a stock market rally and an improvement in credit and 
financing markets in the last stretch of the year. This trend was particularly pronounced in 
the emerging markets, where capital inflows notably stepped up at the end of summer, 
coinciding with the new expansionary turn in US monetary policy. This situation unleashed 
strong tensions in exchange rates due to the dollar’s tendency to depreciate against most 
currencies; in particular, the euro returned to levels of approximately $1.40.
Coinciding with the fresh stimulus in the United States, US long-term bond yields in-
creased to around 3.5% at end-2010, mainly reflecting better expectations for growth. 
This rise in long-term rates contributed to easing strains in exchange rates and capital 
flows to emerging economies, alleviating monetary policy dilemmas in these countries at 
a time when inflationary pressures were increasingly evident. In this context, the triggering 
of a new episode in the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in November, caused by 
problems with banks in Ireland, had a very limited impact on international financial markets 
in comparison with the episode in May.
Overall, the world economy ended 2010 with a growth rate that was slowing slightly (close 
to 4.5% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms) and a favourable outlook. The emerging 
economies remained notably robust, growing by 7.1% year-on-year in that period. For 
their part, the developed economies also experienced a slight deceleration and expanded 
by 2.4% year-on-year (with an annualised quarterly growth rate of 1.5%), partly owing to 
the fall in inventories. In the United Kingdom and Japan growth decelerated and negative 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates were recorded on account of the fall in private demand. 
However, in the United States activity rose in the last part of the year and GDP increased 
by 3.1% in annualised quarter-on-quarter terms in Q4, supported by private consumption 
and the favourable contribution from the external sector. In any event, output gaps in the 
major developed economies were still negative at the end of 2010 and unemployment 
rates held at historically high levels (see Chart 3.3).
In the early months of 2011, the main trends discussed have firmed: the recovery in the 
United States, strengthened by the revival of the labour market and the normalisation of 
financial markets. The ongoing problems in the euro area – with the bailout of Portugal in 
April – have not significantly affected global markets, while the political crisis in the Arab 
countries and the earthquake in Japan are having a global impact, since they contribute to 
... which contributed to 
improving the economic 
outlook and anchoring the 
confidence of financial 
markets, although it triggered 
strong movements in 
exchange rates
The new strains which 
appeared in autumn in the 
euro area did not have a 
significant impact on 
international markets
In the final stretch of 2010, 
world growth moderated 
slightly, although the US 
economy picked up
Despite the substantial 
negative shocks in the early 
months of 2011, the outlook 
remains favourable
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the rise in commodity prices but without having seriously compromised the confidence in 
the recovery.
Price developments remained contained in the first half of 2010, but inflation posted wide-
spread rises after the summer (see Chart 3.6). The main factor behind this increase was 
the rise in commodity prices (agricultural products, metals and oil), which held on a rising 
trend throughout the year, that was only briefly interrupted in Q2, and gained strength in 
the final quarter (see Chart 3.6). In 2010, as a whole, the overall index increased by 24%, 
with notable rises in food (28%) and oil (23%) prices. This trend, which was the result of 
growing demand from emerging countries, continued in the early months of 2011 and was 
strengthened in certain cases by cyclical supply factors (see Box 3.2).
Inflationary pressures were more pronounced in the emerging economies than in the ad-
vanced economies. In the United States inflation reached 1.5% year-on-year at end-
2010, which was lower than in the euro area (2.2%), whereas in Japan it held at negative 
Inflationary pressures only 
began to become widespread 
towards the end of the year, 
driven by the notable rise in 
commodity prices
SOURCES: Datastream, Goldman Sachs, national statistics and Banco de España.
a CRB indices.
b Aggregate calcuated on the basis of data for 57 countries representing 90% of world GDP.
c Aggregate calculated on the basis of data for 45 countries representing 83% of world GDP.
d India, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
e Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Croatia.
f Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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Commodity prices rose sharply from mid-2010 and in many cases 
were higher in early 2011 than in 2008 (see Chart 1). This general 
rise poses significant challenges for the developed economies, 
owing to the potential impact on inflation and the risk to the eco-
nomic recovery.
The dominant factor in the general rise in commodity prices is the 
increase in world demand, stemming principally from the emerg-
ing economies (in particular, from China) and, to a lesser extent, 
from the recovery in the developed economies. As a result of this 
increase, the world demand for many commodities (including 
foodstuffs) is at an all-time high. Behind these developments lie 
cyclical factors, and also structural ones, relating to changes in 
consumption habits. In the case of oil, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) expects the demand for oil in 2011 to be more than 
89 million barrels per day (mbd), as compared with 86 mbd in 
2008. The emerging economies are responsible for the increases 
in the demand for oil in recent years, given that energy efficiency 
improvements and the severe economic crisis in the advanced 
economies have significantly reduced their demand (see Chart 2).
At the same time, various supply-side factors have also temporar-
ily affected the prices of some commodities. Notable in the case of 
foodstuffs have been poor harvests, primarily due to adverse 
weather conditions, which have led to export restrictions in some 
countries. In the case of oil, since the beginning of the year, politi-
cal tensions in various producing countries in North Africa and the 
Middle East have generated fears of a significant reduction in pro-
duction.
Moreover, the upward trend in prices may have been exacerbated 
by an increase in financial flows into commodity markets, against 
BOX 3.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMODITY PRICES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Bloomberg, Datastream and Banco de España.
a Forecast according to the International Energy Agency.
b The shock simulated relates to a 2% reduction in global production excluding Saudi Arabia.
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a background of abundant liquidity at the global level and of a 
higher relative preference on the part of investors for this type of 
assets. However, the evidence on the causality between flows and 
prices in these markets is not conclusive. The question is even 
more complex in the case of those commodities that have rela-
tively high storage costs, such as oil, in which investments are 
made in futures and options markets. The channels through which 
the prices of these financial instruments may affect spot prices are 
not clear.
Higher commodity prices have effects on inflation and activity. As 
regards inflation, the pass-through of the rise in international pric-
es for commodities to their domestic prices depends on ex-
change rate fluctuations against the dollar (the reference currency 
for most commodity prices), duties and taxes, the ability of im-
porters to mitigate the increase by lowering their margins and 
transport and distribution costs. For their part, changes in do-
mestic commodity prices may affect consumer prices through 
various channels. First, an increase in commodity prices has di-
rect effects on the CPI, which will be all the larger the greater their 
weight in the representative consumption basket. Second, there 
will be indirect effects, in the form of increases in production and 
distribution costs, which are more important in the case of energy. 
Finally, the so-called “second-round effects”, which reflect the 
incorporation of the initial rise in prices into price and wage for-
mation processes, so that the original shock is eventually passed 
through to inflation expectations and underlying inflation. The 
various studies that have analysed the impact of a rise in oil pric-
es on inflation in the developed economies generally find rela-
tively moderate effects, which principally stem from the direct 
impact of the higher cost of commodities on inflation. Thus, a 
10% increase in the price of oil would involve a rise in the euro 
area CPI of some 0.2-0.4 pp.1
At the same time, higher commodity prices have a contractionary 
impact on the net importing economies via three main channels. 
First, relative prices change, causing households and firms to 
spend a higher proportion of their income on goods derived from 
such commodities, to the detriment of other products. Second, 
firms’ production costs rise. And third, they may give rise to a con-
tractionary monetary policy response. In the net exporting econo-
mies, by contrast, the impact is expansionary, through the in-
crease in the terms of trade. However, it should be pointed out that 
the impact on activity will be very different depending on whether 
the rise in commodity prices is due to a sudden reduction in sup-
ply or to an increase in demand, owing to higher global economic 
growth.2
The recent tensions in the Arab countries make consideration of 
a scenario of reduction in the world supply of oil pertinent. The 
model used includes the consumption and production decisions 
of oil importers and exporters, taking into account, in particular, 
the different and strategic role of Saudi Arabia as the “dominant 
producer”, i.e. the only country with surplus production capaci-
ty.3 The results show that, given a fall in the supply of a pro-
ducer equivalent to 2%4 of the world market, the oil price would 
increase by 12% (see Chart 3). In response to this rise, Saudi 
Arabia would increase its oil production to make up for part of 
the fall in supply, so that the fall in world production would be 
smaller (0.5%). The initial impact on the GDP of the developed 
economies would be -0.4 pp, a fall that would be progressively 
absorbed and disappear after three years (see Chart 4). Accord-
ingly, the effects on the activity of the developed economies of 
an oil supply shock would be moderate, in line with the results in 
the literature.5
BOX 3.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMODITY PRICES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPED ECONOMIES (cont’d)
2  For an in-depth discussion of the different responses of the economy 
and oil prices to changes in world supply and demand, see Anton Nakov 
and Galo Nuño (2010), “Un modelo sencillo para analizar las causas y 
consecuencias de las variaciones en el precio del petróleo”, Boletín 
Económico, February, Banco de España, pp. 67-78.
3  For a technical description of the model used, see Anton Nakov and 
Galo Nuño (2009), “Oilgopoly: a general equilibrium model of the oil-
macroeconomy nexus”, Documentos de Trabajo, No. 0932, Banco de 
España.
4  As a reference, Libya represents 1.8% of the world oil market and during 
the crisis its market share fell by 75%.
5  The cited paper by Strauch et al. (2010) presents values of 0.2-0.4 pp, 
for a broad range of models, in response to a rise of 10% in oil prices. 
Some authors also stress that the impact of oil price shocks on GDP has 
been diminishing on account of the lower rigidities in labour markets, 
lower oil consumption per unit of GDP and the improvement in the con-
duct of monetary policy. In this connection, see O. Blanchard and J. Gali 
(2007), “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s 
So Different from the 1970s?”, NBER Working Paper No. 13368.
1  See, for example, Rolf Strauch et al. (2010), “Energy markets and the 
euro area macroeconomy”, Occasional Paper Series, No. 113, ECB or 
Luis J. Álvarez et al. (2011), “The Impact of Oil Price Changes on Span-
ish and Euro Area Consumer Price Inflation”, Economic Modelling, No. 
28, pp. 422-431.
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rates, although in the closing months of the year it moved into positive territory. By con-
trast, in the United Kingdom, it climbed to 3.7%, and breached 4% at the beginning of 
2011. The performance of core inflation was more stable and moderate, in line with the 
persistently wide output gap and surplus capacity. Similarly, inflation expectations re-
mained firmly anchored. By contrast, in the emerging economies inflation rose to 5.6% at 
end-2010, reflecting the higher weight of food and energy in their consumption baskets 
(although subsidies tend to mitigate fluctuations in final prices), strong private demand 
and narrower output gaps, which in Asia and certain Latin American economies had al-
ready closed. By region, inflation at end-2010 stood at 6% in Eastern Europe, 6.9% in 
Latin America and 5.1% in emerging Asia. Core inflation also showed a slight upward 
trend (in China and Brazil, in particular) and inflation expectations rose in some econo-
mies. The rising trend in inflation continued into the early months of 2011, as a result of 
the continuous upswing in commodity prices: in February inflation was 2.1% in the ad-
vanced economies and 5.7% in emerging economies, and in many Asian and some Latin 
American countries it has breached its pre-crisis rates. This situation has prompted a 
notable change in the monetary policy outlook, in particular in the developed economies, 
as described below.
At the beginning of 2010, gradual economic recovery and financial normalisation presaged 
a progressive withdrawal of the support given as a result of the crisis, albeit at different 
paces in the developed and emerging countries (more gradually in the former and more 
decisively in the latter). However, several events altered these prospects and contributed 
to accentuating the differences in the conduct of economic policies between emerging 
and developed countries, and also among the latter.
The main developed economies began the year with the intention of exiting their extraor-
dinarily expansive policies, which were implemented in response to the crisis. The chal-
lenge they faced consisted of reducing public support, which was leading to inflationary 
risks and doubts about the sustainability of fiscal positions, without harming the recovery.
In the monetary policy area, the debate centred on how and in what sequence non-stand-
ard measures would be withdrawn and when official interest rate rises would begin. The 
improvement in the financial and banking situation led to a natural unwinding of the use by 
financial institutions of certain assistance. Thus, in Q1, most of the extraordinary liquidity 
facilities in the United States and in the United Kingdom expired and the asset purchase 
programme of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England was completed. In the euro 
area too certain measures, such as the covered bond purchase programme and special 
longer-term refinancing operations, came to an end. In contrast, the Bank of Japan contin-
ued to introduce new measures, against the backdrop of persistent deflation. Neverthe-
less, uncertainty about the strength of the recovery and the absence of inflationary pres-
sures led to the postponement of when interest rate rises were expected – even in the 
United Kingdom, despite its higher inflation – a trend that was to continue throughout the 
year. Official rates were raised in other developed economies that were further ahead in the 
cycle (Sweden, Australia and Canada).
In spring the uncertainty surrounding the euro area sovereign debt crisis and doubts about 
the strength of the recovery in the United States delayed the withdrawal of monetary stim-
ulus and led to divergence in economic policy stances. Overcoming the sovereign debt 
crisis became a necessary priority in the euro area, whereas in the United States – and in 
a slightly different context, in Japan – concerns centred on avoiding a possible double-dip 
in activity and, even, the risk of deflation.
3  Economic policies
3.1  ECONOMIC POLICY 
DIVERGENCE IN THE 
DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
At the beginning of 2010, a 
progressive exit from non-
standard monetary policy 
measures in the developed 
economies was anticipated, 
against a backdrop of 
withdrawal of the stimuli 
introduced as a result of the 
crisis
The sovereign debt crisis in 
the euro area and uncertainty 
about the recovery in the 
United States opened up a 
widening gap between the 
economic policies of the 
developed economies
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The notable deterioration in fiscal variables in 2009 called for a gradual, but decisive, with-
drawal of the fiscal stimulus (see Chart 3.7). However, public debt increased further in 
2010 (by around 8 percentage points (pp) of GDP in the advanced economies as a whole), 
while fiscal deficits barely declined, standing at around 10% of GDP in the United States, 
Japan and the United Kingdom, and 6% in the euro area. The tensions prompted by the 
sovereign crisis in May led to an acceleration of fiscal adjustment in the euro area coun-
tries (see Chapter 4) and also in the United Kingdom (see Chart 3.7). In the latter country, 
the new government introduced a drastic fiscal adjustment (based on spending cuts and 
tax measures, including an increase in VAT of 2.5 pp and a new tax on banks), which will 
reduce the structural deficit by more than 8 pp of GDP over the next five years.
In marked contrast, activity doubts in the United States and Japan led to fresh fiscal ex-
pansion plans towards the end of the year. The main measure in the United States was the 
approval in December of a new fiscal package, of more then $800 billion (almost 6% of 
2010 GDP) for the next 10 years, notable being the extension of tax cuts that were due to 
expire and of unemployment benefits. This plan may raise the structural deficit by between 
1.5 pp and 2 pp of GDP, in 2011 and 2012, and delay the start of fiscal consolidation. For 
its part, Japan introduced a new fiscal package of around 1% of GDP in October and fol-
In the fiscal sphere, the euro 
area sovereign crisis 
accelerated the adjustment in 
Europe, while in the United 
States and Japan new fiscal 
stimulus plans were 
introduced towards the end of 
the year
SOURCES: IMF, Datastream, Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Banco de España.
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b IMF forecasts.
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lowing the earthquake in March 2011 approved a supplementary budget of a similar 
amount for the reconstruction work.
In the monetary policy sphere, the weakening of activity led to the possibility of new non-
standard monetary policy easing in the United States and in the United Kingdom in the 
summer. This was not the case in the euro area, which did however continue to provide 
ample liquidity to the financial system and put in place a government bond purchase pro-
gramme for the countries most affected by the sovereign tensions, to restore the transmis-
sion mechanism. Official interest rates remained unchanged in all cases during 2010, al-
though in the first few months of 2011, in the face of the rise in inflation, the date on which 
the markets expected official interest rate rises to begin moved forward (see Chart 3.8). In 
fact, the upward cycle in the euro area began in April, with a rise in interest rates of 25 
basis points (bp), to 1.25%.
The second phase of quantitative easing in the United States (known as QE II) was an-
nounced in August and commenced in November. It consists of the staggered purchase 
by the Federal Reserve System of $600 billion of Treasury bonds, to be completed in June 
2011, along with the reinvestment of another $300 billion of balance sheet assets reach-
ing maturity. The intention was to ease monetary and financial conditions, by reducing 
long-term interest rates and increasing the prices of a range of financial assets, in order 
to improve the outlook for agents and to increase their inflation expectations. Notwith-
As regards monetary policy, 
there was a new phase of 
quantitative easing in the 
United States
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standing the debate on the effectiveness and risks of QE II, subsequent developments 
appear to indicate that it has contributed to this objective, although long-term interest 
rates rose sharply following the start of the programme, the initial downward movement 
having occurred in advance. For its part, in October the Bank of Japan extended its lend-
ing facilities and its programme for the purchase of financial assets (including govern-
ment securities), with a new fund equivalent to 1.1% of GDP. After the earthquake in 
March, it doubled the volume of purchases and injected massive amounts of liquidity. In 
the United Kingdom, the possibility of an extension of non-standard measures eventually 
disappeared, owing to the risk that agents’ expectations would become unanchored, 
given that inflation has been standing at more than one percentage point above target for 
the last two years.
There are many reasons for the divergence in the economic policies of the main developed 
economies: differences in diagnosis, strategy and priorities in the presence of inflationary 
risks and economic weakness, and different degrees of freedom to design policies. How-
ever, in an increasingly integrated global economy, in which the policies of the largest 
countries have implications for the rest, these divergencies may generate tensions and 
reactions by other countries, as has already happened in the monetary and foreign-ex-
change arena after QE II in the United States, undermining the international coordination 
efforts that were established after the crisis (see Section 4.3).
The emerging economies avoided the impact of the crisis more successfully than the de-
veloped ones. Their recovery has been more rapid, assisted by robust economic funda-
mentals, less need to deleverage than in the developed economies and zero or low expo-
sure of their financial systems to problematic assets. The situation in the EU Member 
States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 has been different. Most of them were hit hard 
by the crisis and their recovery has been weaker, owing to the larger imbalances and finan-
cial vulnerabilities accumulated during the years leading up to the crisis, as well as their 
close economic links to the euro area.
The combination of improved growth prospects in the emerging economies, renewed ap-
petite for risk in global financial markets and the persistence of very low interest rates in 
the developed economies led to a resurgence of capital flows towards the emerging coun-
tries during 2010. In Asia and Latin America these flows exceeded their pre-crisis levels 
(see Chart 3.9). These flows intensified after the summer, given the expectations of further 
monetary stimulus in the United States, creating significant difficulties for macroeconomic 
management and the fear of excessive exchange-rate appreciation. A significant portion 
of these larger flows towards the emerging economies is possibly permanent in nature, 
being the result of a global reallocation of capital, associated with better growth prospects 
and reflecting the weight and growing importance of these regions in the world (see Box 3 .1). 
However, the capital inflows are perceived in these countries as having a temporary 
component – especially after their intensification at the end of 2010 – with the attendant 
risks of excessive exchange-rate appreciation or sudden reversal.
The sizeable capital inflows and appreciation pressures coincided with growing pres-
sures on inflation, giving rise to a monetary policy dilemma in the Latin American and 
Asian economies. On the one hand, interest rate rises were desirable to contain the 
increase in inflation – against a background of closing output gaps and rising commod-
ity prices – and to avoid the unanchoring of inflation expectations. On the other hand, 
interest rate rises might contribute to fuelling the capital inflows and increasing the 
pressure on the exchange rate. The emerging economies responded to this challenge 
The economic policy 
divergence reflects both 
differences in the economic 
situation and in the 
assessment of medium and 
long-term risks 
3.2  ECONOMIC POLICY 
DILEMMAS IN THE 
EMERGING ECONOMIES
Expectations of strong 
economic growth in the 
emerging countries were 
confirmed
2010 saw sizeable capital 
inflows, that were especially 
large in certain countries
The capital inflows, combined 
with upward inflationary 
pressures, posed a dilemma 
for monetary policy
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with a combination of measures: interest rate rises, controlled appreciation and accu-
mulation of reserves, as well as administrative or macro-prudential measures, and even 
capital controls.
Interest rate rises were made in Asia and in most Latin American countries, although they 
were interrupted or toned down when capital inflows were at their strongest, following the 
summer. Many countries also used quantitative measures – primarily increases in reserve 
requirements – to tighten monetary conditions. With regard to exchange rates, larger ap-
preciations were generally tolerated in Latin America than in Asia. In China the authorities 
announced a return to the pre-crisis exchange-rate regime and permitted some apprecia-
tion of the renminbi against its reference basket, but its extent was limited. There was also 
a generalised intensification of accumulation of reserves to mitigate exchange-rate appre-
ciation, with the result that the holdings of these assets reached new historic highs (see 
Chart 3.9).
SOURCES: Datastream and IMF.
a Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, Confederation of Independent States, Middle East and emerging Asia.
b IMF forecasts. 
c CPI-based. An increase (decrease) denotes an appreciation (depreciation) of the currency.
d Areas analysed: Emerging Asia (India, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Philippines), Central Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland) and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru).
e Areas analysed: Emerging Asia (India, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Philippines), Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland) and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Colombia).
f 2010: latest data available.
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Many countries considered it necessary to resort to other kinds of measures (summa-
rised in Table 3.2) to deal with the heavy capital inflows and their impact on exchange 
rates. In some countries measures were taken to liberalise financial outflows. In other 
cases, macro-prudential-type measures were adopted to moderate the effects of capi-
tal inflows, such as limits on the growth of real-estate lending or loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratios. Also, measures to hinder the financial movements of non-residents (capital con-
trols) were adopted, with specific features depending on the country concerned, nota-
ble among them being taxes on portfolio transactions in Brazil and South Korea. Unlike 
in previous episodes, capital controls had greater international acceptance, albeit only 
as a last resort.
A contractionary fiscal policy stance in the emerging economies might have facilitated the 
management of exchange rate and monetary policies against a background of highly dy-
namic activity and, in some cases, of overheating. However, although the fiscal results 
were favourable, in marked contrast to the developed economies, the fiscal policy stance 
was not clearly restrictive in practically any country.
The seriousness of the crisis and the subsequent response have highlighted the need to 
articulate macroeconomic and financial policies to avoid the appearance of imbalances 
and to make progress in establishing a more stable economic and financial environment. 
This section reviews the progress towards this objective in three fundamental areas: i) fi-
nancial system rationalisation and restructuring; ii) private sector balance sheet adjust-
ment and fiscal consolidation in the main developed economies, and iii) the coordination 
of international economic policies, to mitigate the risks of re-emergence of global imbal-
ances and of reappearance of financial excesses.
Notable among the measures 
adopted were those to 
moderate capital inflows
Fiscal policy stances did not 
help alleviate the economic 
policy dilemma
4  Towards a global 
environment of greater 
economic and financial 
stability
The achievement of greater 
global economic and financial 
stability requires 
strengthened multilateral 
coordination and the 
adoption of reforms
COUNTRY
(implementation date in brackets)
Brazil (Oct-10 and Mar-11), Thailand (Oct-10)
South Korea (Nov-10)
Establishment of minimum investment period Indonesia (Sep-10)
Thailand (Feb-10 and Sep-10), Chile (Nov-10),
Peru (various)
China, Hong Kong, South Korea (Mar-11)
increasing capital requirements Brazil (Dec-10)
China (various), India (Oct-10), Brazil (Dec-10),
Indonesia (Dec-10), Malaysia (Mar-11),
Turkey (various), Peru (various)
Increasing reserve requirements for foreign-currency deposits Peru (Jul, Sep and Oct-10)
South Korea (Jun-10), Brazil (Jan-11),
Peru (Feb-11), China (Mar-11)
Restrictions on LTV (loan-to-value) and DTI (debt to income) 
in real-estate loans
Increasing reserve requirement (a)
Limit on banks' short foreign-currency positions
MEASURE
Financial kow restrictions 
(capital controls)
Financial kow liberalisation
Tax on jnancial inkows
Liberalisation of capital outkows
Macro-prudential measures
MAIN FINANCIAL FLOWS MANAGEMENT AND MACRO-PRUDENTIAL MEASURES TABLE 3.2 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Cash ratios can also be considered to be an alternative monetary policy measure, although they are increasingly being used with macro-prudential objectives. 
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In 2010 banking activity improved. Most banks reinforced their financial position during the 
year, with the support of strengthening balance sheets and progressive divestment, on one 
hand, and the gradual normalisation of certain wholesale funding and bond issuance mar-
kets, on the other (see Chart 3.5). Also, the profits of international banks recovered to 
around their pre-crisis levels. This behaviour was not homogeneous however: US and Brit-
ish banks achieved high profitability, while that of Japanese and euro area banks was more 
moderate. Capital ratios rose significantly, in line with this improvement and in response to 
the financial crisis. This bolstering of capital took place against a background of stricter 
regulatory requirements and, in some specific cases, with the injection of public capital. 
Cross-border activity remained relatively moderate, but international banks increased their 
exposure to emerging areas, in particular to Latin America and Asia, where the banking 
systems were only temporarily affected by the crisis. Notwithstanding these positive de-
velopments, the process of reorganising and reshaping the banking and financial system 
has yet to be completed, and bank lending and financing conditions continue to be con-
strained by supply-side factors. In addition, numerous segments of the securitisation mar-
kets have still to be reactivated. At the same time, the weakness of the demand for credit 
and the financial fragility of borrowers are also limiting growth in lending to the private 
sector, which is notably slack.
The improvement in the financial sector continued to be underpinned by sizeable support, 
both from governments and central banks. At the end of 2010, the total amount of public 
support actually used by the financial sector stood at around 20% of GDP in the main 
economies, which was almost the same as in the previous year (see Chart 3.10). In gen-
eral, there was a reduction in the support in the form of Treasury guarantees and central 
bank liquidity and financing facilities, which was offset by the increase in central bank as-
set purchases. In the United States, public support stood at 22% of GDP as at end-2010 
(5 pp less than at end-2009), with a notable reduction in the support in the form of capital 
injections. The level of financial support in the United Kingdom remains the highest among 
the main advanced economies, at more than 50% of GDP, although it has fallen slightly. In 
Japan and in the euro area there was a fresh increase in support in 2010, although from 
much lower levels (6% and 15% of GDP, respectively). Given the nature of this support, in 
which outright purchases and capital injections are gaining in weight, it is likely to be main-
tained for a prolonged period.
In 2010, the financial and regulatory reform initiatives coordinated at the global level lost 
some of their prominence to domestic ones. However, among the former, the approval by 
the G20 in November of the set of measures known as Basel III should be highlighted. 
These measures involve a strengthening of the capital and liquidity requirements to be met 
by financial institutions, at the global level, although some aspects have still to be devel-
oped (liquidity ratios, systemic institutions, etc.) and the period for full compliance is gen-
erous (until 2018, in some cases).
Among the reforms proposed at the national level, the Dodd-Frank law was passed in the 
United States and in the United Kingdom the government presented a consultative doc-
ument outlining a new reform, which must be approved in 2011. The main characteristics 
of both these financial reform programmes are set out in Table 3.3. They have common 
elements, such as the far-reaching review of regulatory and supervisory structures and 
the creation of institutions in the macroprudential area and for the protection of financial 
service consumers. Unlike the gradual strategy adopted by European countries, the US 
reform proposes a global transformation, extending to most of the financial sector, to 
reduce the probability of new crises and to mitigate their potential effects on the economy 
4.1  FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
REFORM: SITUATION, 
PROSPECTS AND 
PROCESSES
The processes to adjust and 
reorganise the banking sector 
moved forward last year …
… driven by the continued 
existence of sizeable public 
support …
… and regulatory and financial 
reform
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and, in particular, on public finances. The reform proposed by the new British govern-
ment focuses more on the regulatory architecture and assigns a larger role to the Bank 
of England.
One adjustment that needs to be made following the crisis is linked to the excessive in-
debtedness of the private sector in the main developed economies and to the necessary 
deleveraging process (see Chart 3.10). In the United States, Japan and the United King-
dom (in contrast to the euro area) the ratio of non-financial private-sector debt tended to 
decline in 2010. In the case of households the decline reflects the increase in disposable 
income, high savings rates and weak lending. In the corporate sector, the fall was main-
ly the result of rises in financial asset prices. However, private sector deleveraging is 
proceeding slowly and, on historical evidence, can be expected to continue for several 
years. Persistently very high debt ratios not only hamper economic recovery (by limiting 
the leeway for private demand expansion), but also represent a risk to financial stability, 
since further adverse developments may lead to default, with negative repercussions for 
creditors.
4.2  DELEVERAGING 
PROCESSES
Private-sector indebtedness in 
the main advanced economies 
continues to hamper 
economic recovery and 
endanger financial stability 
SOURCES: Datastream, Goldman Sachs, national statistics, Banco de España, Federal Reserve, ECB, Bank of England and Bank of Japan. 
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On top of these problems of excessive private-sector indebtedness has come the sharp 
increase in public debt (by 15 pp of GDP on average in the main advanced economies 
since 2008), which has offset the reduction in private debt. The upward trend in public debt 
is still far from being contained in most of the advanced countries, and highlights problems 
of fiscal sustainability and the general need for consolidation in the advanced economies, 
in addition to the adjustment imposed by the sovereign crisis in Europe. As discussed in 
Section 3.1, in countries like Japan and the United States, which also display unsustaina-
ble long-term fiscal trends (see Chart 3.7), fiscal consolidation has been postponed, since 
it has been subordinated to short-term priorities. In short, the need for fiscal adjustment 
and ongoing private-sector deleveraging will weigh on growth prospects in the advanced 
economies in the coming years.
Following the sharp correction recorded in 2009, global imbalances grew moderately last 
year, in line with the recovery and the increase in commodity prices (see Chart 3.10). This 
growth was reflected in the slight increase in the absolute value of current-account bal-
ances, to 4.5% of world GDP, although this was well below its pre-crisis levels (around 6% 
in 2006). Among countries with current-account deficits, that of the United States in-
creased slightly, to 3.2% of GDP, less than half its level in 2006. Among countries with 
surpluses, the increase in those of oil exporting countries was notable. By contrast, the 
surplus in China fell slightly, to 5.2% of GDP. As a result of this growth in imbalances, they 
have become one of the G20’s main concerns once again.
The financial crisis highlighted the complexity of the links between economies and finan-
cial systems, and the overriding need for international coordination of national actions in 
order to achieve balanced growth that is sustainable in the medium term. The G20 has 
consolidated its position as the main forum for this coordination, underpinned by the 
In addition, there are problems 
arising from the increase in 
public-sector indebtedness
4.3  GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
COORDINATION
Global imbalances grew in 
2010, following the significant 
correction in 2009
The G20 has consolidated its 
position as the forum for 
economic policy coordination 
at the international level …
UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM
Nature and state of the 
reform
General: Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act.
Partial, gradual and segmented 
reforms. Current institutional 
framework focus.
Approved, but still to be 
implemented.
Approval of legislation foreseeable 
for mid-2011.
Financial stability
Financial Stability Oversight 
Committee (FSOC).
Financial Policy Committee.
coordination Presided and coordinated by the 
Treasury.
Led by the Bank of England.
Supervision Multiple supervisors.
Solvency supervisor separate from 
market performance (Twin Peaks).
Treatment of systemic 
institutions
Separation of activities Volcker rule and other limits.
Under study by the Independent 
Commission on Banking.
Consumer protection
Independent agency attached to 
Federal Reserve.
Independent agency.
Remuneration systems
Higher capital and liquidity requirements, strengthened supervision, new 
resolution regimes, living wills and stress tests.
Principles based: deferred salaries and conditionality based on medium-
term performance.
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL REFORMS TABLE 3.3 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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prominence within it of the emerging economies, in line with their greater importance at the 
world level (see Box 3.1). Against this background, reduction of global imbalances is one 
of its main objectives. In addition to repeating the need for orderly and gradual fiscal ad-
justment, the G20 has recommended countries with current-account deficits to take 
measures to stimulate saving and promote competitiveness, while urging surplus coun-
tries to adopt measures to stimulate internal sources of growth. With the aim of fostering 
greater commitment among its members, the G20 has based this debate on a “Mutual 
Assessment Process” and has just defined a set of indicators of macroeconomic imbal-
ances for countries of major global importance, in relation to which assessments and 
policy recommendations can be made.
Notwithstanding the intense activity centred on the G20, the impetus for coordination 
weakened last year. The different rates of economic recovery and the different domes-
tic priorities have given rise to diverging policy responses, as analysed in Section 3, 
which have not always been well received by the rest of the economies. In particular, 
the new expansionary phase of monetary policy in the United States acted as a trigger 
for significant intervention in the foreign exchange markets by emerging countries and 
some developed countries, such as Japan and Switzerland, and led to greater resort to 
administrative measures and capital controls, that ultimately run the risk of segmenting 
international capital markets, and thus acting against the climate of international coor-
dination.
In short, the results of international policy coordination were ambiguous last year. On one 
hand, a certain fatigue can be perceived, following the peaks of tension in the economic 
crisis, and a trend towards the prevalence of national interests. At the same time, the G20 
has consolidated its position as the forum for governance of the world economy and has 
an intense agenda.
The baseline scenario of the economic outlook for 2011 is for continuity of the global re-
covery, although at a more moderate rate than in 2010. According to the IMF’s latest fore-
casts, world growth in 2011 will be 4.4%, half a percentage point down from 2010, and the 
notable difference between the advanced and emerging economies will be maintained. 
This scenario is subject to notable downside risks, particularly in the developed econo-
mies, where the economic momentum continues to be based largely on policies of mon-
etary and fiscal stimulus. Self-sustaining growth in domestic demand and, in particular, 
private consumption requires a significant improvement in labour markets (which is still 
insufficient, despite the positive signs in the United States, in the first quarter of 2011) and 
progress in deleveraging. At the same time, a stronger pick-up in private productive in-
vestment in the United States cannot be ruled out, owing to the strength of company bal-
ance sheets and the firming of confidence.
The deterioration in public finances and its link to the fragility of the financial systems 
are another important source of risks. The new fiscal stimulus programmes in the 
United States have sustained growth in the short run, but have postponed fiscal con-
solidation, while concerns have been growing regarding the situation of state and lo-
cal authority finances, which could erode the long-term fiscal position. In general, 
there is a risk of a sudden and substantial rise in the cost of financing public debt in 
the developed economies, given the imbalance between the supply and demand for 
public debt securities that may be generated during the recovery. The increase in 
long-term rates may have a further negative impact on domestic demand and finan-
cial stability.
... although, the impetus for 
coordination has weakened
5  Outlook and risks
The economic outlook is for 
continued growth at a 
somewhat more moderate 
rate, with significant downside 
risks, owing to the weakness 
of the fundamentals in the 
developed economies...
… intensified by the fragility of 
public finances…
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At the same time, despite the improvement in the financial situation, the restructuring of 
some banking systems has still not been completed, and the necessary reshaping of the 
financial architecture will depend on the implementation of regulatory reform at the na-
tional and global levels. The impact of these developments on financing conditions, the 
flow of credit and, more generally, activity, is still uncertain.
The most palpable risks in the current situation arise from the upward trend in commodity 
prices (in particular, that of oil), which has intensified since early 2011 owing to the con-
flicts in the Arab countries. The direct impact on activity may be limited, but the possible 
monetary policy reactions to a sharp rise in inflation, and their impact on uncertainty, when 
confidence has still not been firmly established, would have more significant consequenc-
es. In addition, the policy dilemmas in the emerging economies may be exacerbated. In 
these economies risks of overheating and of increases in financial vulnerabilities are dis-
cernible, although the uncertainty associated with greater inflationary pressures may re-
duce the attractiveness of these economies and stem inflows. In any case, from a long-
term perspective, the higher commodity prices, inevitably associated with growing demand 
from the emerging economies, may constrain global growth capacity and affect its distri-
bution by region.
In short, although the recovery in the world economy seems to be firming, the obstacles 
and challenges are notable, and the risks are on various fronts, including the inflation one. 
Against this background, economic policies designed to strengthen the foundations of 
growth and financial stability should prevail over more short-term stimuli, although these 
have been vital at the most acute moments of the crisis.
... against a background in 
which the normalisation and 
reshaping of the financial 
system remains slow 
The rise in commodity prices 
is a serious threat to global 
growth 
These risk factors require the 
implementation of policies to 
strengthen the outlook for 
growth and financial stability 
